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The view that the living world is divided into part-whole hierarchies can already be found in 
ancient philosophy (cf. Aristoteles’ De partibus animalium) and it is deeply embedded in the 
biological sciences. Biologists represent objects as being constituted of a certain collection of 
organized parts. For example, cells are said to consist of a cell membrane that surrounds the 
cytoplasm that contains various organelles. Assumptions about part-whole relations are 
involved in classifications of biological objects into kinds (e.g., the assumption that fish have 
gills, whereas mammals have lungs). Furthermore, the methodological principle that one can 
understand the behavior of a biological object by decomposing it into its parts remains 
important for generating knowledge in the biological sciences (Bechtel/Richardson 2010).  
Despite this ubiquity and importance of part-whole relations to biology, the 
philosophical question of what it means for an object X to be a biological part of another 
object Y is still disputed. Does biological parthood require only mereological parthood? Does 
it require that X is spatiotemporal part of Y (and how can this be specified)? Is one biological 
“whole” demarcated from another by the many and intense causal interactions among its 
parts? Must the behavior, activity, or operation of a part in a certain sense be relevant to the 
behavior or functioning of a whole? 
An understanding of the conditions under which something is a biological part of 
some “whole” is relevant to the biological sciences since it might help to solve problematic 
cases: for example, when does a vesicle that is transported in a eukaryotic cell become a part 
of the Golgi apparatus? Is the case that is attached to the Caddisfly larva and that protects it 
against predators a part of the larva or does it belong to the larva’s environment? How can the 
parts of the human genome be identified? 
Philosophers have gone different ways in answering the question of biological 
parthood. Some try to develop a monistic account, that is, they seek to identify a single 
criterion or list of criteria that is universally applicable to all biological fields and that 
provides us with clear answers. Others adopt a pluralistic position and claim that in biological 
practice different “theoretical perspectives” (Wimsatt 2007, pp182) or “partitioning frames” 
(Winther 2006, pp475) can be found, which imply different criteria for individuating 
biological parts, and thus generate different decompositions. Some pluralists go even so far 
and argue that different decompositions of the same biological system often are not coincident 
and cannot be integrated into a single picture of what the system’s parts are. 
One way of seeking a monistic conception of biological parthood is to consult 
mereology. However, it quickly becomes clear that classical extensional mereology is 
insufficient to provide a criterion for biological parthood in particular (rather than for 
parthood in general). To see why, suppose you cut an earthworm with a scalpel into, let’s say, 
five slices of arbitrary length. According to mereology, these slices count as “proper parts” 
(e.g., Simons 1987) of the earthworm since the relation between slices and earthworm 
satisfies the mereological principles of antisymmetry, irreflexivity, and transitivity. The same 
holds for the body wall or the nervous system of the earthworm. But even though the slices, 
the body wall, and the nervous system all are mereological parts of the earthworm, only the 
latter two are biological parts.  The reason is that the body wall and the nervous system, but 
not the slices are things whose behaviors and properties biologists seek to explain and that are 
object of biological reasoning, prediction, and intervention.  
Among those philosophers of biology who seek a monistic approach to biological 
parthood three major criteria are discussed: spatiotemporal inclusion, intensity of interactions, 
and causal relevance. Biological parts are frequently assumed to be spatiotemporal parts (e.g., 
Craver 2007, Leuridan 2012). But so far it has not been sufficiently analyzed what the 
requirements of spatial and temporal inclusion amount to (cf. Kaiser 2015, Chapter V). 
Spatial inclusion seems to require the independent identification of a spatial boundary inside 
of which the parts must be located. Temporal inclusion is only possible if the relata of the 
parthood relation are not only continuants such as objects but temporally extended occurrents 
such as processes, states, or events. 
Proponents of the interactionist account of biological parthood (e.g. Simon 1962; 
McShea 2000) argue that a set of parts can be picked out as a “whole” because the parts of the 
whole interact more frequently and more intensively with each other than with objects in the 
environment. In other words, the intensity and bandwidth of causal interactions is assumed to 
be the criterion for identifying part-whole relations (in biology and in other areas). Gillett 
(2013) holds a view that seems to combine the notion of a spatiotemporal part and the 
interactionist approach. His main thesis is that an individual object X is a biological part of an 
individual object Y iff X “is a member of a spatiotemporally related team of individuals many 
of whose members bear powerful and/or productive relations to each other” (2013, pp321). 
Already van Inwagen (1990, pp81) has argued that biological parthood essentially 
involves causation. In the same spirit for instance Mellor characterizes biological parts as 
“working parts” (2008, pp68) and claims that parts must have significantly large effects on the 
properties of the whole. Even though both accounts refer to causal relations (or interactions) 
this view clearly differs from the interactionist account as it requires the behavior, activities, 
or operations of biological parts to be causally relevant to the behavior of functioning of the 
“whole”. This holistic aspect, the reference to a behaving whole is missing in the 
interactionist account. Note that the assumption that causal relevance is the proper parthood 
criterion need not have the controversial implication that part-whole relations are a special 
kind of causal relations. Additional assumptions or additional criteria of biological parthood 
(such as the spatiotemporal inclusion criterion) can prevent this implication as they violate 
conditions that are said to be characteristic for causal relations (e.g. asymmetry, asimultaneity, 
independence). Craver avoids confounding part-whole and causal relations for instance by 
specifying the causal relevance criterion as “mutually manipulability” (2007, 141), which is a 
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1 Mutual manipulability means that a change in the behavior of the mechanism as a whole leads to a change on 
the levels of the parts and a change of the behavior of a part leads to a change in the behavior of the mechanism 
as a whole. 
Bechtel, W., Richardson, R. C. 2010, Discovering Complexity. Decomposition and 
Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Craver, C. F., 2007, Explaining the Brain. Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of 
Neuroscience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gillett, C., 2013, “Constitution, and Multiple Constitution, in the Sciences: Using the Neuron 
to Construct a Starting Framework”, Minds and Machines 23 (3): 309-337. 
van Inwagen, P., 1990, Material Beings, New York: Cornell University Press.  
Kaiser, M. I., 2015, Reductive Explanation in the Biological Sciences. An Ontic Account, 
Springer. 
McShea, D. W., 2000, “Functional Complexity in Organisms: Parts as Proxies”, Biology and 
Philosophy 15: 641-668. 
Mellor, D. H., 2008, “Micro-Composition”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 83 
(62): 65-80. 
Simon, H. A., 1962, “The Architecture of Complexity”, Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 106 (6): 467-482. 
Simons, P., 1987, Parts. A Study in Ontology, Oxford: Clarendon.  
Wimsatt, W. C., 2007, Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings. Piecewise 
Approximations to Reality, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Winther, R. G., 2006, “Parts and theories in compositional biology”, in: Biology and 
Philosophy 21: 471-199. 
 
